Why Pakistan is an ‘important partner’?

Why It Matters

On 11 February 2026, S. Paul Kapur, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, formerly a Fellow at the Hoover Institution, a conservative Think Tank and Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School (NSP), testified before a Congressional Committee on the broad contours of emerging U.S. policy toward the region. An academic specialist in South Asian politics, terrorism, security, and nuclear issues, Kapur is the author of Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamic Militancy and Pakistani State (Oxford, 2017). In that work, he advances the contentious thesis that Pakistan has, since its inception, deliberately employed Islamic militancy as an instrument of national security because of inherent state weakness. While his testimony was not about the book, this “weak state–militancy nexus” argument provides an important intellectual backdrop to understanding Washington’s evolving approach.

Key Themes of the Testimony

Kapur’s remarks covered a wide agenda: trade, energy flows, maritime security and piracy, counterterrorism, strategic minerals, and defense cooperation; ranging from weapons sales and co-production to joint military exercises. The Committee’s questioning, however, was sharply focused on India’s role in containing China. Members pressed for India to “do more,” positioning it as a pivotal partner not only in South and Central Asia; which in my view can aptly be termed Greater South Asia, home to nearly two billion people and two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, but also across the Indo-Pacific.

Within this broader framing, Kapur described Pakistan as “another important partner,” particularly in the development of critical mineral resources. He noted that U.S. government seed financing, combined with private-sector expertise, could yield mutual economic benefit. It appears to me that, this acknowledgment signals a dual-track U.S. approach: deepening strategic alignment with India while maintaining functional engagement with Pakistan.

Strategic Direction and Its Implications

1. U.S.–India Defense and Trade Alignment: Tariff reductions (reportedly from 50% to 15%) and the 2025–2035 U.S. and India Defense Framework Agreement point to an expanding ten-year strategic partnership encompassing trade, energy, technology, and defense co-production.
2. India as Regional Anchor: The U.S. view positions India as the “anchor” of South Asia, interestingly, though not a hegemon. China cannot be excluded from the region, but its diplomatic and economic footprint is to be constrained. Washington seeks to deepen cooperation with India in curbing Russian oil purchases (insisting Russian oil purchases fuels Ukraine war), expanding joint military exercises, and enhancing strategic coordination.
3. Countering China’s Economic Outreach: Chinese infrastructure financing—especially in Sri Lanka (Hambantota Port) and Maldives, which was implicitly framed as “debt-trap diplomacy” and economic coercion, reinforcing the U.S. counter narrative against the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
4. Indo-Pacific and the Quad: Citing the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy, the testimony emphasized strengthening quadrilateral cooperation with Australia and Japan through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and aligning partners to prevent domination by any single power. Strategic facilities such as Diego Garcia were viewed within this wider security matrix.
5. Selective Silences: Notably absent were references to India–Pakistan normalization, dispute resolution in South Asia, the status of Kashmir, or Muslim and other minority concerns within India.
6. Afghanistan was discussed primarily in terms of unresolved resettlement challenges for Afghans who had supported NATO forces. Repatriation and re-settlement of anti-Taliban Afghans in the U.S remains an irksome issue.

Policy Gaps and Regional Concerns

The testimony underscored maritime security (given that roughly 80% of energy trade transits the Indian Ocean), counterterrorism, and economic integration. Yet it left unaddressed how durable stability can be achieved without parallel efforts at regional conflict resolution. It appears to me that a containment-driven strategy risks intensifying polarization rather than fostering cooperative security.

What Should Be Pakistan’s Strategy?

1. Economic Diversification and Connectivity: Expand trade and transit with Central Asia; re-engage Afghanistan pragmatically; and seek U.S. support for the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline. Recently the presidents of Tajikistan (November 2025) and Uzbekistan (February 2026) visited Pakistan, and signed agreements and MOUs.
2. Defense Modernization: Strengthen naval and air capabilities, expand joint exercises, and modernize defense production, simultaneously rightsizing the role and size of Pakistan army.
3. Human Capital Investment: Prioritize skill development to transform Pakistan’s youth into globally competitive, exportable talent.
4. Strategic Hedging: Build bridges between the U.S. and China, positioning Pakistan as a credible intermediary rather than a ‘proxy’ or a ‘client state’. Concurrently, encourage Washington to support structured dialogue between India and Pakistan on territorial disputes and broader regional stability/peace.

Concluding Thought

The U.S. policy appears to be consolidating around India-centric balancing against China, with selective engagement of Pakistan. For Islamabad, the challenge lies in moving beyond reactive diplomacy toward calibrated economic statecraft, regional connectivity, deepening ties with China, and preserving strategic balance.

Testimony source: ForeignAffairs.House.gov, South Asia: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Region, Wednesday, February 11, 2026, 2:00 PM.